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VICTOR  BRUDNEY'  AND  RICHARD  F.  WOLFSON*
Wiley B. Rutledge, the last of the eight Supreme Court Justices appointed
by President Roosevelt, took his seat on February  15,  1943.  By that time his
brethren had all but unanimously discarded much of the constitutional  doctrine
fashioned  by their predecessors.  But  they  were  in  open  disagreement  over
the constitutional  mold in which  to  cast newly  developing  powers  of  govern-
ment-both state and federal-and newly invoked civil rights of the individual.
Moreover,  while  the Justices  all  acknowledged  that the  Constitution  left to
the other  branches of  government broad room for adoption of regulatory  and
fiscal  policies  deemed wise  or necessary,  they differed  fundamentally  among
themselves  on how far the Court could or should fill in the interstices left  by
the  legislative  or  executive,  if not  also  on the merits  of  the policies  adopted
by  those  branches  of government.  In  addition,  the war  had  brought  in  its
wake  the  initial  stages  of  the  conflict  between  individual  freedom  and  na-
tional  security  and the problem of the  Court's  function as  arbitrator  between
military  restraints  and  civilian liberties.
M\r.  Justice  Rutledge's  background  as  a  law  teacher  and  his  service  on
the Court of  Appeals  for the District  of Columbia  had given  him  more  than
passing familiarity  with these issues.  But for him, as  for his predecessors  in
periods  when constitutional  doctrine  and the business  of the  Court had  been
relatively  stable, a period of adjustment was necessary, the more  so in dealing
with  the newly  developing  problems.  As a  result, his first terms  were  spent
in the  labor and study necessary  to enable him conscientiously  to vote on the
varied  issues presented to him,  and yet to carry his  fair share  of the  Court's
work.  Death met him at the end of his sixth year on the  Court, after he had
completed  his apprenticeship  but before he  had proceeded  far  in  a  master's
work.
The judicial product of his brief tenure evidences the considerable talents
he  brought  to  the Court  and  suggests  the direction  his  jurisprudence  would
have  followed.  Others  will  tell of  his  stature as  a Justice-of  the  faith  he
brought  to the Bench, of the views  he espoused  during his tenure, and  of the
significance of his contribution  to the Court's efforts to mark out new lines of
liberty and rights for the individual and of power for the various arms of gov-
ernment.  In  this  piece  we  essay  only  a  few  discrete  reflections  born  of
our clerkships.
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On first exposure  to the Justice's  easy  geniality in chambers,  a law clerk
was apt to feel that he had come to work  for a man who was attuned  more to
an unhurried, yet substantial, practice  in a small western city, than to the cold
Olympian  marble  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Preparation  of  his  first  opinion
for the  Court b.egan  with  a casual,  almost  simple,  suggestion  to his  clerk to
"take a  crack at it."  But, before the Justice had completed the writing of the
opinion,  it was clear that  his apparently  easy  going  attitude toward  his work
covered a pervading, almost nagging, sense of  responsibility  which  drove him
to give unstintingly of himself to the exacting task of adjudication.  Whether
the issues presented were of large public import or, as in so many of the cases
appearing on  the docket,  only transient  in  nature,  the  Court's  business  com-
pletely  absorbed  the  Justice's  attention  and  devotion.  This  was  true  even
when  he  understood  the limited  contribution  the  Court  could  make  toward
solving  the particular problem.
Characteristic  of the thoroughness  with which  he devoted  himself to that
business  were the sessions  on Friday nights  before the regular  Saturday con-
ferences.  It was his  custom-until  forbidden to  do  so  by his  doctor-to  sit
with  his  law  clerk,  into the  following  morning if  necessary,  and  go  over  in
detail the cases to be decided and the petitions  for certiorari.  Every memoran-
dum on an in forma pauperis  petition, of which there were an increasing num-
ber  during his  tenure, was  carefully  read,  underlined,  and  discussed,  and  if
there were any doubts, the original, often ill-written papers were sent for and
examined.  Similarly, he  took  considerable  time  to  examine,  as  he  received
them,  the draft  opinions  of  his brethren.  While he  did not  read  them  in  a
hypercritical  spirit,  he  was  generally  reluctant  to  concur  in  what  was  said
without  careful  analysis  of  all the  implications.  Even  when  his  might  not
be the deciding vote-though frequently  it was-he felt it part of  his obliga-
tion  as  a  Justice  to  give  acquiescence  only  to  views  which  he  had  himself
thought through.
For him, justice  was a  deliberative  process, and  fast justice  more  likely
to be injustice.  Because  he understood  acutely both the depth and complexity
of the conflicting  social interests implicit in legal issues presented to the Court,
he was  unwilling-indeed,  unable-to  ignore  them  in the  decision  of  a case.
However, his understanding of the necessity, as well as of the duty, of judicial
self-restraint made him reluctant  freely to translate his own social  preferences
into  answers  to  legal  questions.  Rejection  of  these  easy  routes to  decision
posed  for him,  as  for some of  his brethren,  a  dilemma  which  could  only  be
resolved  on a case-to-case  basis.  The substance  of Justice  Rutledge's  resolu-
tion of this dilemma is to be  found in his opinions, of which others  will write.
But, it was because  he was aware of the problem that his vote was not to  be
cast until he had ruminated over a case, had satisfied himself that he had found
the core of the problem presented,  and had  seen the full import of the resolu-MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM
tion  suggested.  Such  consideration  generally  required  time;  and  there  was
not always time  to be  had.  Hence  his  occasional  reservations  in  concurring
opinions  or  the statements  dubitante, or the  reservation  of  his  vote  at  con-
ference.  When,  as  on more than  one  occasion,  as  a  result of  this insistence
on  further time  for  reflection,  he or  others  changed  their vote and  the  out-
come  of  the case,  not all  of  his brethren  of the quondain majority were  left
without irritation.
The  stubborn  process  of  mulling,  studying, and  thinking-through  which
the decision of cases exacted from him did not mean that the Justice was with-
out strongly held  social and, in the broadest  sense of the word, political views.
Nor did it mean that he conceived that the Court,  and his role on it, could  or
should be a wholly neutral force  in the nation's affairs.  On the contrary,  he
knew when the Court's attitude  would necessarily  exert influence  on the life
of the country.  And his opinions-especially  in dissent, when he was freed of
the necessity to tailor the  opinion to the differing  attitudes  of  a  majority  of
his brethren-testify  forcefully  to his views on the larger  questions he felt to
be  fairly within  the judicial  competence.  But, while  his  opinions reflect  his
comprehension  of the social and political  base in which particular  legal  issues
were grounded,, and suggest the breadth of  his familiarity with legal  doctrine,
they do  not disclose the full force of his imaginative  insight into the interplay
between, legal  doctrine and underlying  social or political  issues.  This  insight
did not merely point to  solutions or analyses  of problems  which his brethren
conceded  to  exist.  It  enabled  the Justice  to  sense,  and  press,  a  large  issue
where others were inclined to see a small one,  or to ignore the problem, as  in
Thomas v. Collins' or the  Yamashita case.2
Although he frequently felt under the pressure of time, paradoxically  his
most  effective  work was  done  when  the pressure  was greatest.  When  con-
siderations of public welfare were thought by some to make it imperative  that
the Court act speedily-as in the Yamnashita case,  or the Lewis decision 3-- he
prepared  some of his best  opinions.  Ordinarily, however,  when the demands
of time were less compelling, he preferred to draft and redraft.  After exten-
sive reading and  discussion  of the case  with  his law  clerk,  the Justice  would
begin the work of writing his opinion.  In some cases, if the law clerk's earlier
research  resulted in a draft opinion which coincided  with the Justice's notions
of  the  case,  he  would use  it  as  a text-interlineating,  cutting,  and  adding.
More  often,  he would begin  afresh,  and,  using  some  of  the  materials  from
his  clerk's memorandum,  he  would  write,  cross  out,  and  write  again.  The
longhand,  lined  yellow  sheets  would  then  go  to  his  secretary  for  typing.
1. 323 U. S. 516  (1945).
2.  In re Yamashita,  327  U. S.  1, 41  (1946)  (dissenting  opinion).
3.  United  States  v.  United  Mine  Workers,  330  U.  S.  258,  342  (1947)  (dissenting
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Further alterations, particularly  if writing had disclosed  a  need for additional
research,  would  be  made  on  the  typed  pages.  Finally,  the  typed  copy  was
offered  to  his  clerk  for  comment,  discussion,  and  modification,  after  which
it was sent  to the printer.  Changes  and  additions  frequently  were  made  in
this  draft, so  that  the  opinion  circulated  to  his  brethren  might  well  be  the
second or third printed draft.  While the circulated  opinion was rarely changed,
the Justice might, in deference  to the other Justices, add to  or subtract  from
the opinion,  or make ambiguous  what had been explicit;  for the need to hold
a  majority was  an ever-present  consideration.
This process of writing and rewriting was essential  to the formulation  of
the Justice's ultimate decision.  It not only focused his attention  on the line of
reasoning  to be developed,  but it forced  careful exploration  of  aspects  of the
case at which  his earlier  examination  had only hinted.  It was  for this  reason
that  he often would  write out  a dissent  or  concurrence  which  he  would  later
decide against publishing.  By writing it, he was  able  to  formulate his  ideas
for conference  discussion and  ultimate vote.
In the process of  reaching a decision he,  no less than  any of  his brethren,
strove to eliminate  the essentially  accidental  considerations  that  derived  from
the plight of the particular parties to the case at hand.  But he could not, and
indeed would not, erase from his mind the fact that the vehicle  for decision was
a live controversy,  involving the hopes and  expectations of particular  litigants
and the efforts and energies  of particular  lawyers.  As  a result, he  was loath
to  have  an  opinion  of  his  own  go  down  without  giving  indication  that  the
Court  was  cognizant  of,  even if it seemed  to accord  no  consideration  to,  the
impact of  the result on the parties involved.  In large  measure this  accounted
for his  insistence-sometimes  at  the  expense  of  clarity,  and  always  at  the
expense  of brevity-upon  working  into the opinion  all but the most patently
untenable  arguments  of  counsel  and  all but the  most  plainly irrelevant  facts
in the case.  To show  the litigant, particularly  the losing litigant,  that  all  his
contentions had been considered  was, for the Justice, a part of the duty of  the
Court-as  much  because  he  believed  that  human  beings  were  entitled  to  no
less,  as  because  he believed  that  law  was  most  effectively  administered  and
accepted when the judged were shown that decision  was  not merely a  process
of  deduction from impersonal  abstractions.
This attention  to the human  aspects  of litigation  reflected  a part  of  his
personality  on  which  operated  harshly  that  isolation  which  membership  on
the Court tends to  impose upon Justices-both  because  of the nature of  their
duties  and  the  burden  of  their  work.  By  temperament  and  background  he
was gregarious  and sociable.  Although,  not particularly a  "joiner"  or leader
of  social  organizations,  he  counted  heavily  upon  companionship  with  other
people, a companionship which for him was not simply a diverting or enjoyableMR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM
part  of  life,  but  the  essential  source  of  all  that  was  both  stimulating  and
relaxing.
While  his work  was  in  the medium  of  ideas  and  values,  it  was  not  in
isolated  reflection  or research  that he  found  his greatest  pleasure,  or indeed
the greater  part of his instruction.  Inquiry into the meaning,  derivation,  and
impact of legal ideas, and discussion of them, were opposite  sides of the same
coin.  Hence,  although he  looked  to the  written  word  as  embodying  our  ac-
cumulated  knowledge  and wisdom,  the fullest development  of. his  own under-
standing  and  the refinement  of  his ideas  came  through  extensive  discussion
with  others, particularly with  those  who  did not share his views.  Mforeover,
such  discussion was more than a matter of clarifying his own ideas.  Whether
it  was  the product  of  his  long career  as  a  teacher,  or of  the underlying  im-
pulses  that  directed  him  into  teaching,  he  delighted  in  talking  to  people,
especially  young  people,  about  the  varied  ideas  and  insights  that  interested
him, and in stimulating his listeners  to response  and criticism.
Mlore  important  to  him than  the pleasure  he  derived  from  the give  and
take  of  pointed  discussion  were  the  satisfaction  and  understanding  he  ob-
tained  from constanit  association with other  people.  The alacrity and warmth
with which  he  received  visitors at  the  Court-often  at the  expense  of  post-
poning  his work  for the evening hours-evidenced  keenly  the  loss he  felt  in
being  deprived  of more  frequent  opportunities  for their  company.  And  the
variety and number of people,  from all parts of  the country  and all  levels  of
the community, who  were his  friends  reflected  the respect  he  held  for other
people  and his  deep-rooted  belief  in their  essential worth  as  individuals.  'In
an atmosphere which  on occasion  was  less than  cordial, and which more  than
once provoked  his brethren to less than charitable utterances  about each other,
he was rarely willing to take an unkind view of any of his fellow Justices.  This
is not to say that he was either piously good or unperceptive,  or that if he dis-
agreed  with any of them he  felt undue  deference or restraint in so  indicating.
A man of goodwill, no more with his brethren than with other  people would he
permit  differences  of  opinion or attitude to disintegrate  into personal  malice.
But the life of the Court,  despite his refusal to make private  disputes  of
public  differences  and despite  his abiding  and heartfelt  friendship  for  some
of the Justices, denied to him the time and opportunity for the wide companion-
ship  he  had known prior  to his appointment.  While  he ultimately  reconciled
himself  to  this  denial,  he  remained  unwilling,  almost  unable,  to  refuse  the
frequent  invitations  of former  students or  of friends  to  attend dinners  or to
spend informal evenings.  When he could not accept such an invitation,  it was
a  cause  of  great  regret,  based  more  on his  missing,  than  disappointing,  the
company.  The more formidable  demands  on his time,  involving preparation
of  commencement addresses  at universities with which he had been associated
or of speeches  to bar associations  to which he had belonged, were  a source  ofINDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
considerable  debate within  chambers, with his  secretary and  law clerks gener-
ally urging him not  to  accept, and the  Justice  agreeing  with  them  too rarely.
Fully cognizant  of  his isolation,  indeed  occasionally  expressing  a  desire
to return to academic life, the Justice looked, in part, to his law clerks to bridge
the gap between  the Court  and the  outside  world.  Interviewing  prospective
law clerks,  he would  say that  one of  the reasons he needed  a  clerk  was that,
cloistered  in  the Supreme  Court,  he  felt  out  of  contact  with the  world,  and
particularly,  with  young people  and their  opinions.  He wanted  to know  the
ideas  of  a  different  generation,  and  he  wanted  someone  around  him  who
would  feel free to offer these ideas.  To this end he encouraged  his law  clerk
to put forward his own  notions and  prodded him to  defend  them.  A visitor
sitting outside the  Justice's  office  might  be  surprised  to  hear  strong  words
within, both  in the  Justice's  familiar  drawl  and  in a  younger  voice.  For  if
his  law clerk  took  the hint  and  pressed  hard,  the  Justice  felt  free  to  retort
in kind.
In  their  intellectual  relationship,  the  clerk  was  constantly  made  to  feel
equal.  His attention was directed to every  aspect of the Justice's work.  Not
only was  each case  and petition  for certiorari  a  candidateP for joint  examina-
tion, but the draft opinions of other Justices were regularly  left with the clerk
for comment  and  frequently  for  discussion.  And  the  clerk  was  expected  to
contribute his views  as to the result to  be reached,  as  well as  to the rationale
to reach it.  Indeed, he  was at liberty, one half  hour before a decision  was to
be  announced,  to  go  into the  Justice's  office  to  plead  again  that  he  change
his vote.
There  may  be  room  for doubt  whether  the extent  to  which  the Justice
thus  encouraged  his  law  clerk  to  participate  in  the work  was  an  unalloyed
blessing to the former.  But for the clerk, the resultant sense  of  participation
lent depth to an intrinsically  interesting assignment.  The intimate association
which  such  working  methods  developed  offered  the clerk  the  opportunity to
know, and perhaps  to absorb,  the quality of  the man.  Close  relationship  with
the Justice  continued  for many  of  his clerks,  after the  period  of their  clerk-
ship was over.  Correspondence  between them, visits to his home in Washing-
ton, and the hospitality which Mrs. Rutledge  and he extended with  a generous
hand, maintained and cemented the ties already created.  To his former clerks
the Justice  was  freely  available  as  a source  of  advice  and  assistance;  and  in
turn, he  welcomed  them  as  in some measure  confidants  in whom  trust  could
be  reposed.
During visits to the Justice  in the last years,  his earlier  clerks  perceived
an accentuation,  if not a shift, in the emphasis  of  his  interest  in the  Court's
work.  His initial zest in dealing with all segments of the Court's docket seemed
to be tempered by his growing concern with the cumulating  civil liberties prob-
lems.  More  and more  of his  energy was devoted to  concentration  on the in-MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM  461
creasing number of  obstacles  he felt were being thrown  up to block  the road
to a  democratic  way  of  life  for  the nation.  To  keep  unimpeded  that  road
became  for him the  great  responsibility  of the  Court  in  our  time.  Events
since his  death  disclose the  significance  of  his presence  on  the  Court  in the
discharge  of that responsibility..